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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CRr'..l( ~ CALDWELL and ROBERT
.E. COVINGTON, dba CALDWELL
AND COVINGTON,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

No.

9587

ANSCriUTZ DRILLING COMPANY,
li\C., a corporation,

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF

APPELL~TS

Appeal from the Judgment of the Fourth Judicial District
Court for Uintah County, Hon. Joseph E. Nelson, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action v.rherein plaintiffs seek a decree of specific
performance requiring defendant to assign and deliver certain
oil and gas leases to the plaintiffs or in the alternative, if the
same cannot be done, to require defendant to pay damages for
breach of contract.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence and after a stipulation by the defendant, the
trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment of dismissal and
a new trial.
STATEMEN1. OF FACTS
Plaintiffs respectfully advise the Court that the record filed
with the above-entitled Court by the Clerk of Uintah County
is not numbered by page and it will be, therefore, necessary
to refer to pleadings and other documents by their designation
and not by page number.
Plaintiffs and defendant corporation are engaged sepa ·
ratel y in exploration for oil and gas, together with buying
and selling oil and gas leases. On February 16, 1961, the
plaintiffs telephoned the defendant corporation in Denver,
Colorado, and talked with H. 0. Lynch, its president, stating
that they '\vould be willing to pay a certain price per acre for
certain oil and gas leases held by the defendant, and requested
the defendant to prepare a contract of sale incorporating therein
the proposed terms of sale and to forward the same to plaintiffs'
office in Vernal, Utah, for execution. The contract of sale was
prepared by the defendant and signed. It was then mailed to
plaintiffs' office in Vernal, Utah, on February 17, 1961. (Defendant's Answer and Affidavit of H. 0. Lynch).

2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Paragraph nine of the contract stated:
"This contract must be executed by buyer and the
earnest money and executed copy of this contract received by seller on or before February 23, 1961, or
this contract is null and void, and the seller and buyer
is relieved of any obligations hereunder.''
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 3)
Paragraph four of the contract required that upon execution of the contract that buyer deliver seller a certified check
in the amount of one-fourth of the purchase price. (Plaintiffs'
Exhibit No. 3).
On the 22nd day of February, 1961, one of the plaintiffs
telephoned the defendant in Denver, Colorado, and talked
with its president, H. 0. Lynch, concerning the time limitation
set forth in the contract and informed Lynch that because of
the holiday occurring on this date, they would be unable to
obtain a certified check and forward the same to defendant
in Denver within the time required in the contract. Lynch
then told plaintiffs that paragraph No. 9 need not be complied
with as long as it was understood that a deal had been made
(Tr. 101).
The defendant maintains that a time extension was given
the plaintiffs but only to the 24th day of February, 1961. (See
defendant's Answer to plaintiffs' Complaint) .
The plaintiffs, in reliance upon the conversation with
Lynch, contacted A. M. Alloway, their attorney in Denver,
Colorado, and asked if he would execute the contract with the
defendant in Denver at its office (Tr. 11). At approximatley
2:50 p.m. on the 24th day of February, 1961, Alloway received
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the contract by n1ail from plaintiffs with written authority to
sign the same on their behalf. Alloway then went to defendant's office to discuss execution of the contract and ~o suggest
some proposed minor changes in the contract (Tr. 51, 52, 53).
At this time, Alloway talked to Lynch and was told that
defendant would not accept any of the suggested changes
made by Alloway (Tr. 54). Alloway then told Lynch that he
would execute the contract for the planitiffs in its present form
and tendered his personal check to Lynch in the amount
required as earnest money in the agreement. Lynch then
stated that he would not accept a personal check and demanded
that the check be certified. (Tr. 56, Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 7).
Alloway then asked Lynch if he would accept cash but was
told that cash was not acceptable (Tr. 59). Lynch also said
that the defendant had received a better offer for the leases
(Tr. 57).
Alloway immediately went to the bank in a nearby building
and was informed by the bank that no checks could be certified nor could cashiers' checks be issued after the hour of
3:00 p.m. (Tr. 57, 58). He then returned to defendant's
office and was told by Mr. Wakefield, another officer of defendant corporation, that Lynch had gone home. Alloway
explained his inability to get his check certified because of the
late hour and requested Wakefield to accept the check. Wakefield refused to do this (Tr. 58, 59).
The following morning, Alloway telephoned Lynch and
offered a check for the full purchase price stated in the contract
but Lynch refused to accept the same (Tr. 61).
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POINT URGED FOR REVERSAL
1

TI-IAT 1 HE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DIRECTING
A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS AND SHOULD HAVE
GRANTED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
THAT THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DIRECTING
A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS AND SHOULD HAVE
GRANTED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
In order to properly review the proceedings and points
of law involved, plaintiffs will treat defendant's motion and
the trial Court's order of dismissal as one for a directed verdict
as .the evidence was heard by the Court sitting with a jury.
Plaintiffs' evidence adduced at the trial, coupled with the
pleadings and stipulation of the defendant, clearly shows that
there was a waiver by defendant of the terms of paragraph nine
of the contract in question.
There was a dtspute between the parties concerning the
extent of the waiver admittedly granted by defendant. This
issue, being one of fact, should have been submitted to the
jury. Counsel for defendant also made the following stipulation
at the trial and at the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence:
"We offer to stipulate that if Mr. Craig Caldwell, one of the
plaintiffs herein, were present and called as a witness, he would
testify in substance and effect as follows:
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((On February 22, 1961, I contacted Mr. Lynch by
telephone and informed him that because of the holiday
of February 22, 1961, that I could not deliver a certified
check in the amount of $3,487.89, as earnest money
and as provided in paragraph 4 of said contract. Mr.
Lynch informed me that the deal was made and that 1
need not be concerned about the time element specified
in paragraph 9 of said contract" (Tr. 101).
It is plaintiffs' contention that defendant should have
given them a reasonable time in which to obtain a certified
check to be presented as earnest money as they had accepted
defendant's offer. The authorities agree with this view. See
1 Williston on Contracts, 3rd Edition, ( 1957) at page 171,
Section 53, wherein the author states:
((Not infrequently an offeror who has imposed a
limit of time in his offer does not care to insist upon
it and by further negotiations may indicate a continued willingness to stand by the terms of his offer.
Any such manifestation of continued willingness in
effect is a new offer which may be accepted and if
accepted will ripen into a contract."
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that defendant, after receiving a better offer for the ]eases, did everything possible to
avoid the contract and deliberately connived to thwart payment
of the earnest money. The only possible reason for requiring a
certified check would be to guarantee payment. When certification could not be obtained, cash should certainly suffice.
Defendant should not be permitted to mislead the plaintiffs in
an effort to avoid receiving payment. See Schaeffer vs. Coldren,
23 7 Penn. 77, 85 Atlantic 98, wherein the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania said:
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"One party to a contract may not, by agreeing to
a modification of the terms of payment, mislead the
other and then, when too late to make other arrangements, refuse to accept the terms agreed on and defeat
the right to exercise its option.''
This Court went on to say in substance that a seller is
estopped to deny a tender of payment where, by the seller's
own acts, it was made virtually impossible for the buyer to
meet the terms.
It is plaintiffs' contention that the
waiving paragraph 9 of the contract,
believe that they had a reasonable time
certified check and deliver the same to

defendant, by orally
led the plaintiffs to
in which to obtain a
the defendant.

Plaintiffs did suggest minor changes in the contract which
were refused by defendant but plaintiffs did not withdraw
their acceptance; nor did their suggestions constitute a rejection
of defendant's offer. In support of this position, we respectfully
cite 1 Williston on Contracts, 3rd Edition ( 1957) at page 261,
Section 79, wherein is stated:
"Frequently an offeree, while making a posthve
acceptance of the offer, also makes a request or suggestion that some addition or modification be made.
So long as it is clear that the meaning of the acceptance
is positively and unequivocably to accept the offer
whether such request is granted or not, a contract is
formed.''
In support of this proposition the author cites cases from
numerous jurisdictions.
The trial Court, in granting defendant's motion to dismiss,
deprived plaintiffs of the jury's determintaion of a material
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issue of fact. This Court has said on numerous occasions that
in deciding a motion for a directed verdict, the Court rnust
consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the party
against whom the motion is directed and should find every
controverted fact in his favor. Boskovich vs. Utah Construction
Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 P. 2d 885; Finlayson vs. Brady, 121
Utah 204, 240 P. 2d 491; Hewitt vs. The General Tire and
Rubber Co., 3 Utah 2d 354, 284 P. 2d 471.
Under our system of jury trials, it is the province of the
jury and not the court to determine all questions of fact and
to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses as they appear
before them and testify. The court determines and decides
questions of law and directs its application to the facts, but
the jury is to determine the disputed facts of the case from the
evidence adduced, in accordance with the instructions given by
the court. 53 American Jurisprudence, Paragraph 293, Page
248.
Likewise, a cause should never be withdrawn from the
jury unless it appears, as a matter of law, that a recovery
cannot be had upon any view of the facts which the evidence
reasonably tends to establish. If there is conflicting evidence,
and any view that the jury might lawfully take of it will sustain
their findings for either party, the facts should not be "rithdrawn from them. 53 American Jurisprudence, Paragraph 299,
page 251.
Applying these princip1es to the instant case and viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we
respectfully submit that the plaintiffs sustained their burden
of proof in making a prima facie case and that the trial court
erred in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that there was substantial,
material evidence presented by which a jury could reasonably
have found that defendant waived paragraph 9 of its contract
and that plaintiffs thereafter accepted its offer but were de·
prived of their right to pay the earnest money within a reason·
able time. Defendant deliberately calculated to avoid receiving
the earnest money payment as it had received a better offer
for the leases. The trial Court should have submitted these
issues to the jury but erred in granting a directed verdict and
refusing plaintiffs a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
HURD, BAYLE & HURD
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR
1105 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah

Attorneys for Appellants
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